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This paper uses U.S. time-diary surveys to study the allocation of time devoted to informal learning and 
education by immigrants and natives. We develop a simple theoretical framework, which highlights the 
different constraints and opportunity costs faced by immigrants as compared with natives. In line with 
our theoretical model, the estimates show that immigrants are more likely to engage in informal 
education and, conditional on participation, they allocate more time to these activities. The investment 
in informal learning and education activities is likely to boost immigrants’ human and social capital and 
contribute to socio-economic integration. 
Keywords 




As the number of immigrants has increased in all developed countries, debates about the processes of 
socio-economic integration of foreign-born persons have become much more important and contested 
in policy circles and among the public. Comparisons of immigrants and natives can provide an important 
assessment of the degree of integration of migrants. There is an abundant economic research literature 
that has investigated immigrants’ performance and behaviour with respect to several outcome variables 
such as wages, labor market participation, crime rates, use of welfare support schemes, etc. Less 
attention has been devoted in the literature to the processes that lead to the observed outcomes and the 
resources allocated to them.  
In this paper, we study the time allocated to informal education by immigrants (and natives) in the 
US. For immigrants the investment in informal education might represent a fundamental channel of 
socio-economic integration. In addition, these human capital enhancing activities generate individual-
level as well as community-wide returns1. In their decision to invest in human capital, immigrants face 
different constraints compared to natives. As barriers to formal educational channels might be 
particularly high2, informal education might represent the only real channel for investing in human 
capital in the host country.  
Also, the opportunity cost of investing in these activities might diverge as the time allocated to non-
market-activities is closely related to the shadow price of time and to the productivity of consumption 
time (Becker 1965). Informal education can also be considered an investment in social capital as, 
compared to natives, the density of immigrants’ social networks is limited (Coleman 1988).  
In our study we define informal education as all the activities that have a formative content such as 
taking a class for personal interest and extra-curricular club activities. These activities are closely related 
to lifelong learning and are increasingly important, considering rapid technological changes and 
automation of production processes.  
To our knowledge, this is the first study that analyzes immigrants’ decisions to invest time in informal 
education and that investigates the process of assimilation in terms of informal education over time. In 
the first part of the paper, we present a dynamic theoretical framework that allows us to analyze the 
individual decision of investing in informal education and the role played by the initial level of human 
capital. In the second part, we test the main predictions of the model using the American Time-use 
dataset (ATUS) for the period 2003–15. One of the important novelties of our approach is the use of 
time allocation data. As argued by Hamermesh and Pfann (2005, page 2) “no other sorts of data allows 
us to analyze the determinants of how people allocate time outside the labor market”.  
We show that foreign-born persons are more likely to engage in informal education and, conditional 
on engaging, they spend more time on these activities than natives. Although we provide evidence of 
assimilation with natives, we find that this process is rather slow, and some differences carry on to 
second-generation immigrants. 
                                                     
* Rezart Hoxhaj thanks Stiftung Mercator for financial support under project number PN 14-297. We wish to thank 
participants in the following seminars and conferences: University of Lille, University of Modena-Reggio Emilia, 
International Conference on Economics of Global Interactions (Bari, Italy), European University Institute (Florence, Italy). 
1 Educational and training activities outside formal channels are important ingredients of human capital enhancement for 
broad groups of workers. These investments of time and resources in general improve employment opportunities and might 
lead to higher wages. Lifelong learning and skill updating are fundamental during the working life of an individual (OECD 
2014, Skills beyond school), particularly in occupations characterized by fast technological change. According to Fahr 
(2005), formal education accounts only for a limited part of the required knowledge in the labor market. 
2 High barriers to formal education for immigrants might be, for instance, related to costly and lengthy recognition procedures 
or to limited proficiency in the host-country language. 
Nicola D. Coniglio, Rezart Hoxhaj, Hubert Jayet 
2 Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Working Papers 
Our paper adds to a limited number of recent contributions on the time-use of immigrants (see Ribar 
2012 for a survey). Significant differences between immigrants and natives in time allocated to 
‘assimilation activities’ (purchasing, education, work) are highlighted by the important contribution of 
Hamermesh and Trejo (2013). This study, using ATUS data, shows that immigrants are less likely to 
undertake assimilation activities, but those who do engage in such activities spend relatively more time 
than natives. The authors rationalize these findings on the basis of a theoretical framework in which 
immigrants experience both higher fixed costs and higher returns from time devoted to assimilation 
activities. 
Recent studies from different fields have used time-use data. Vargas (2016) focuses on time 
allocation of Mexican immigrants in the US over ten mutually exclusive activities using 2003–12 ATUS 
data. Their analysis provides evidence of differences in time devoted to work/commuting/leisure by 
gender and marital status. 
An interesting study carried out by Zaiceva and Zimmermann (2014) shows, using data on a sample 
of immigrants and native women in the United Kingdom, that non-white-women (mainly those 
originating from Pakistan and Bangladesh) spend significantly more time on food management and 
particularly religious activities than white women. The study employs a double-hurdle model which 
jointly analyses the decision to engage in a particular activity (namely childcare, food management and 
religious observance) and the minutes of time devoted to it.  
More recently, Caparros Ruiz (2017) has investigated immigrant workers’ time-use in Spain, a 
country that has experienced a sudden and considerable increase in its immigrant population. In this 
study, important differences between immigrants and natives in the allocation of time to a broad set of 
categories emerge. Male immigrants from outside the EU are found to invest more time in studying and 
other activities related to training.  
The only study on the determinants of time allocated to informal education activities is, to our 
knowledge, the analysis conducted by Fahr (2005). Using time-use data for Germany, this study finds 
evidence of a strong relationship between formal and informal education, but Fahr’s analysis has no 
specific focus on immigrants. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the theoretical framework from which we 
derive some testable hypotheses. Section III describes the data used and the empirical strategy we 
employ in our analysis. Section IV presents the results. Section V summarizes the results and presents 
the main conclusions of the paper.  
II. A Simple Theoretical Model 
Let us consider an agent living during a time interval [0, 𝑇]. At every date t, the agent is endowed with 
?̅? units of time that can be allocated to three different activities: consumption (𝑐𝑡), work (𝜃𝑡) and 
informal education (𝑒𝑡). We can express the time constraint as follows:  
∀𝑡: 𝜃𝑡 + 𝑐𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡 ≤ ?̅? 
Time allocated to work generates an income (ℎ𝑡)𝜃𝑡 , where 𝑤(ℎ𝑡) is the wage of the agent, which is a 
concave increasing function of her current human capital level, ℎ𝑡. Let us assume that consumption 
activities are carried out combining time and commodities (that is, goods and services purchased in the 
market). In other words, 𝑐𝑡 units of time devoted to consumption need 𝑐𝑡 units of commodities, bought 
in the market drawing from individual income at price p which we normalize to unity. Then, the agent 
faces the following budget constraint:  
𝑐𝑡 ≤ 𝑤(ℎ𝑡)𝜃𝑡 
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Informal education contributes to the accumulation of human capital. More precisely, the accumulation 
of human capital follows the equation:  
ℎ̀𝑡 = 𝑎 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑒𝑡 − , 0) 
where ℎ̀𝑡 is the time derivative of ℎ𝑡, a is the efficiency of informal education in generating new human 
capital and < ?̅? is a sunk time cost: only time devoted to informal education beyond  contributes to 
human capital accumulation.  
The agent maximizes the following intertemporal utility function:  




where 𝑢(𝑐𝑡) is a standard concave increasing instantaneous utility function.  
Given our assumption that informal education is not a direct source of utility, the existence of the 
sunk time cost, , implies that either the agent is not involved in informal education (𝑒𝑡 = 0) or devotes 
at least  units of time to informal education3.  
The full solution of the model is developed in Appendix 1. Here, we informally present the main 
results. Two forces determine the optimal choice of time devoted to informal education: decreasing 
returns to human capital and the length of remaining life. Decreasing returns to human capital imply 
that, the higher the current level of human capital, the lower the future return to the new human capital 
generated by informal education. The shorter the remaining life, the lower the future return of capital 
accumulated with informal education. This effect will be particularly strong if informal education is 
largely undertaken, as we assume here, for productive purposes rather as a pure leisure good (that is, for 
consumption purposes). 
If the initial level of human capital, ℎ0, is high enough, the agent decides not to engage in informal 
education (𝑒𝑡 = 0, all t) because of the decreasing marginal returns to human capital: the marginal 
increase in consumption generated by additional informal education is too low. For lower values of ℎ0, 
the agent starts devoting some time to informal education above the sunk time cost: 𝑒𝑇 > . Both the 
decreasing returns to human capital and the shortening of the remaining life imply that the time devoted 
to informal education decreases with age and agents who are old enough may not be involved in informal 
education.  
Decreasing returns to human capital imply that, at every age, an agent who starts from a higher initial 
level of human capital (ℎ0 higher) must devote less time to informal education than an agent whose 
initial endowment in human capital is lower. Most immigrants are less endowed in human capital than 
natives and, moreover, human capital accumulated in the home country is often imperfectly transferable 
to the home country. Then, we expect immigrants to be more frequently engaged in informal education 
and, when they are, to devote more time to these activities.  
A further prediction relates to the time constraint: agents who have more time available everyday (?̅? 
higher) choose to devote more time to informal education. Intuitively, agents who have more time 
resources devote some of these extra time resources to informal education. In this respect, the status of 
immigrant might have an ambiguous effect. One the one hand immigrants—by being less rooted in the 
host society—might experience lower time-absorbing social obligations but, on the other hand, their 
                                                     
3 Informal education often includes activities that can be considered as leisure goods, hence producing direct utility to 
consumers. Here we do not consider the possibility of direct utility from informal education for simplicity and without loss 
of generality. The removal of this simplifying assumption would not change the main predictions of the model but would 
increase the analytical complexity. 
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time-use might be affected by more binding credit constraints or can be absorbed more by time-
consuming non-productive-activities such as commuting (see Hamermesh and Trejo 2013). 
The model also predicts that agents who have a higher efficiency in generating human capital from 
informal education (in the model above, parameter a is higher) devote more time to informal education. 
The effects of informal education activities on human (and social) capital might be particularly important 
for immigrants who face higher barriers to alternative mechanisms of human capital accumulation such 
as formal education. Finally, agents who are more impatient (𝜌 higher) choose to devote less time to 
informal education. Intuitively, more impatient agents value less the future gain from the increase in 
human capital generated by informal education. Generally speaking, immigrants tend to discount the 
future less than natives and are more likely to accept and trade-off temporary hardships against future 
gains. In the next step of our analysis we test empirically these theoretical predictions.  
III. Data and Methodology  
A. Description of the Data 
We use the American Time-use Survey (ATUS) for the years 2003–15 in our analysis4. Individuals 
surveyed in ATUS are selected randomly from households that participate in the Current Population 
Survey (CPS). The sample is representative of the population residing in the United States. Data is 
collected through one-day time diaries5, where participants list the time (in minutes) allocated to 
activities performed in the 24 hours prior to the survey. These activities are defined over a set of 
standardized categories (approximately 400). Finally, for each respondent, information on time-use can 
be matched with a wide array of demographic characteristics and labor market situation collected by the 
CPS. The dataset we use includes approximately 170 thousand observations, where immigrants account 
for 14,5 percent of the total number.  
Time-diary method has several advantages compared to other data collection methods (see Ribar 
2012; and Juster, Ono, and Stafford 2003 for an overview). The most important one is accuracy that 
stems from the short recall period and the episodic format (must add up to 24 hours) which allows for 
consistency checks by the user. Barrett and Hamermesh (2019) argue that this type of data also reduces 
errors related to the different importance given to activities by survey respondents (see Bound, Brown, 
and Mathiowetz 2001).  
Conversely, two main disadvantages of the data are worth mentioning. The first limitation of the 
time-use data is highlighted by Juster, Ono, and Stafford (2003) who show that reporting on occasionally 
performed activities tend to be less reliable. However, in our study, this limitation is not an issue as most 
activities that belong to the informal education category are not occasional and are likely to have a well-
defined time schedules. The second limitation is related to the high variability of time-diary data due to 
the one-day observation6. If interviewed on different days during the year, responses are likely to vary 
across days. One possible effect of the high variability is the reduction of the statistical power of the 
model, especially when estimations use a low number of observations (usually the 2 Tier in our 
estimations). We show below that this drawback is unlikely to undermine our results.  
                                                     
4 The ATUS data set is publicly available upon registration. We used the American Time-use Survey Extract Builder to 
extract the data (Hofferth, Flood, and Sobex 2017) https://www.atusdata.org/atus/ 
5 ATUS diary days are assigned randomly and distributed across the days of the week, with 10 percent allocated to each day 
of the week and 25 percent allocated to Saturday and Sunday. This distribution is based on research showing that in 
weekends the allocation of time is different as compared to the rest of the working days (Horrigan and Hertz 2004). 
6 The most notable differences are between weekdays and holidays for which we control using a dummy that distinguishes 
between weekdays and holidays. 
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Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the dependent variables (informal and formal education). 
All statistics are weighted to reflect the behavior of a representative individual in the US on a 
representative day. The first row in Table 1 presents the time spent in informal education by both 
immigrants (column 1) and natives (column 2). The sample average time spent in informal education by 
immigrants (1.74 minutes) is almost double of the time spent by natives (0.98 minutes). These activities 
are performed more frequently by immigrants (1.2 percent) than by natives (0.9 percent). Conditional 
on participation, immigrants are also shown to spend more time in informal education than natives (141 
minutes vs. 108 minutes). These aggregate statistics are in line with the pattern predicted by our 
theoretical model. With regard to time spent in formal education, no relevant differences exist between 
immigrants and natives. Table 2A in Appendix 2 shows that immigrants and natives are comparable in 
terms of gender, employment status and attainment of advanced degrees (degree and postgraduate). 
Immigrants are of younger age, are more likely to be married and to have children than natives. They 
are also less likely to have obtained a secondary school license than natives (50 percent and 64 percent, 
respectively). Summary statistics also show that the presence of illiterate individuals in the survey is 
very low, among both immigrants and natives (1,06 percent). This feature reduces the likelihood of 
errors in reporting of activities from individuals7. 
B. Estimation Strategy 
To test our hypothesis, we employ a double-hurdle (two tier) method proposed by Cragg (1971) and 
used to analyze differences in the allocation of time between natives and immigrants over broad classes 
of activities by Hamermesh and Trejo (2013). The double-hurdle method incorporates a probit model in 
the first tier that gives the probability that the observation has a positive value and a truncated regression 
in the second tier. As an alternative to a Tobit, this method allows for the possibility that different 
processes determine the two tiers, and hence the model could be estimated over two vectors of 
parameters. In terms of our analysis, the probit model (1st tier) will test if immigrants and natives have 
a dissimilar probability to participate in informal education, while the truncated model (2nd tier), 
conditional on engaging in informal education, will test if immigrants participate more intensively than 
natives in such activities. The specification of the baseline model is presented below: 
1st tier: Probability of participation 




𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝝋′𝑠 + 𝜸′𝑡 + 𝑖𝑠𝑡 
2nd tier: Intensity of participation 




𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝝋′𝑠 + 𝜸′𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖𝑠𝑡 
1. Dependent Variables 
We define informal education as all extracurricular activities that have a human capital component and 
classes carried out outside the formal educational system. Table 2B in Appendix 2 reports the list of 
activities included in the definition of informal education. Given the nature of the data generation 
process, we could not further disaggregate the informal education variable and distinguish between 
activities such as language courses or academic classes from other activities which besides having 
human-capital enhancing effects, can be considered as quasi-leisure activities8. This definition is similar 
                                                     
7 Note that in order to minimize coding and classification errors, individuals describe the activities they perform using their 
own words. These activities are, therefore, classified into a set of standardized activities by ATUS staff. 
8 According to ATUS staff, after a time-diary is processed and codified into standardized categories the original recording 
is destroyed and hence not accessible to researchers. Although further disaggregation of this variable would have potentially 
revealed some heterogeneous effects depending on the specific activity, our main idea is to consider all the activities—
including those that have a strong leisure component—that generate at least potentially positive effects on the accumulation 
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to the definition used by Fahr (2005). More specifically, the dependent variable in the 1st tier equation 
(𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡) is dichotomous and equals 1 if the respondent i declares to have spent time (minutes > 0) in 
informal education during the day the time-diary was recorded, and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable 
in the 2nd tier equation (𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑡) is continuous and measures the time spent (in minutes) in 
informal education by the respondent i during the day the time-diary was recorded. In some estimations, 
we use as dependent variables the probability to engage in formal education and the time spent in those 
activities. Formal education includes non-work-education only (taking classes and performing 
educational activities including research and homework for a degree). 
2. Explanatory and Control Variables 
Our main explanatory variable is 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡. It is equal to 1 if the individual i, who resides in 
state s in year t, was born abroad and 0 otherwise. Based on our theoretical framework, we expect that 
foreign born persons might be more likely to allocate time to informal education for the following 
reasons: i) partial transferability of human capital might imply that marginal returns to informal 
education are higher even controlling for educational attainment; ii) immigrants might have a more 
restricted set of options for human capital enhancing activities; iii) immigrants are generally more patient 
and discount the future relatively less than natives. 
The vector 𝑿′𝑖𝑠𝑡, in both equations, contains individual level characteristics that might condition the 
propensity to participate in informal education and the intensity to perform informal education activities 
such as: the age of respondent and its quadratic form (Age) and its quadratic form (Age squared); gender 
(Female); marital status (Married); the respondent has a child in these age groups (No children, children 
0-2 years, children 3-5 years, children 6-12 years, children 13-17 years); education attainment 
(Illiterate, Elementary, Middle, Secondary, Degree, Postgraduate). We include in our model a set of 
dummies for the work status of the individual (Employed, Unemployed, Not in labor force) and seven 
dummies for the size of the area where the individual resides. With respect to age (and its square) we 
expect, based on the model above, that the return from informal education will be higher for younger 
individuals as they can reap higher benefits in their longer working life. Other individual level 
characteristics—such as gender, marital status, number of children and employment status—are 
included to control for time-constraints that might affect the willingness/ability to allocate time to 
informal education. For instance, we expect that time-constraints will be less binding for unemployed 
or individuals not in the labor force and, on average, female individuals. Time-constraints will be more 
binding for individuals with children.  
Educational attainment is our proxy for the initial level of human capital included in the theoretical 
framework. On the one hand, we expected that higher levels of formal education will be associated with 
lower incentives to invest in informal education as a consequence of our assumption of decreasing 
returns related to these human capital enhancing activities. On the other hand, it is important to 
acknowledge that the leisure value of informal education is likely to be positively related with 
educational level. Besides, formal and informal education might have a certain degree of 
complementarity. Both these aspects might be important and might offset the effects explicitly 
formalized in our theoretical framework. 
Moreover, in the baseline model the vector 𝒁′𝑖𝑠𝑡  contains a dummy indicating whether the diary day 
is a holiday9 (Holiday) and the vectors 𝝋′𝑠 and 𝜸′𝑡  refer to state fixed-effects and year fixed effects, 
                                                     
of human as well as social capital. In this respect, participation in a chess club might be considered as a human capital 
enhancing activity in a way similar to participation in an English language course. Both activities lead to accumulation of 
skills and improve cognitive abilities that might be useful in the labor market. In addition, both activities lead to social 
interactions that might have positive effects by increasing returns to other production factors or simply by increasing the 
chances of employability. 
9 Holidays include Sunday, New Year’s Day, Easter, Memorial Day, 4th of July, and Christmas. 
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respectively. For the exact definition of the variables included in our empirical specification we refer 
the reader to Table 2C in the Appendix 2. 
IV. Empirical Results 
A. Baseline Results 
Table 2 presents the results of the baseline model. Model 1 (1st tier), estimated over the entire sample, 
shows that the probability to participate in informal education activities is 18 percent higher for the 
foreign-born than it is for natives. Conditional on participation (2nd tier), the foreign-born spend, on 
average, 62 minutes (or 57 percent)10 more on such activities than US-born people do in the diary day. 
In this model, we control for a wide range of individual level characteristics, which explain a good part 
of the heterogeneity in the time spent in informal education across individuals. Consistent with our 
theoretical prediction, we find that younger individuals and females are more likely to participate in 
informal education activities. However, the intensity of time spent in such activities is higher for younger 
individuals, and it is lower for females than for men. As expected, individuals with young children are 
less likely to engage in informal education activities than those who have no children, and when they 
engage, the time spent in these activities is significantly lower. Informal education activities are 
performed more frequently but less intensively during holidays. The labor market status of individuals 
determines the time spent in informal education activities. Unemployed and inactive individuals are 
more likely to engage in informal education activities than employed individuals, and the time spent in 
these activities is evidently higher. Unemployed individuals might engage more intensively in informal 
education activities to acquire skills and competences that grant a (future) labor-market return. Besides, 
these individuals are likely to be less time constrained than employed individuals are, as highlighted in 
our model. Finally, the educational attainment is positively associated with the likelihood to engage in 
informal education activities. According to Fahr (2005), highly educated people have a higher 
opportunity cost of their non-market-time and a preference for educational leisure. Another possible 
explanation is the higher complementarity—both in production and consumption – between formal and 
informal education. In Models 2 and 3, we exclude unemployed and inactive individuals from the 
sample—and focus only on employed individuals as these two groups substantially differ in terms of 
time constraints as well as in terms of the opportunity cost of allocating time to non-market-activities. 
In Model 3 we also include dummies controlling for household income levels11. We find that the 
probability to participate in informal education for employed foreign-born is 15 percent higher than 
employed native people and the time spent is also remarkably higher (around 90 percent). 
Our theoretical model and the results of the analysis in Table 2 suggest that one reason why 
immigrants spend more time in informal education is the higher returns they obtain from these activities. 
Consistent with the theoretical prediction, the economic incentive to engage in human capital enhancing 
activities is higher for individuals that could reap the benefits for longer time. For instance, those who 
are close to retirement could have a lower incentive to invest in informal education than individuals at 
an early stage of their working life.  
In Table 3, we test the validity of this argument by including in the baseline model a dummy for 
foreign-born individuals who are 45 years of age or younger and a dummy for foreign-born individuals 
who are older than 45 years of age12. In Model 1, which includes the results of estimations having 
informal education as a dependent variable, foreign-born individuals who are 45 years of age or younger 
                                                     
10 Assessed on the average time spent in informal education by natives. 
11 Income dummies are used to control for the opportunity cost of engaging in non-market-activities. 
12 Only individuals with more than 17 years of age are considered in the estimations. The results hold if the threshold age is 
40 years and when only individuals within 17 – 65 years of age are considered. Results are available upon request. 
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are twice more likely to engage in informal education activities (compared to natives) than foreign-born 
individuals who are older than 45 years of age. The results show the same tendency when the conditional 
amount of time spent in such activities is considered.  
As argued above, informal education activities could represent a fundamental source of knowledge 
and country-specific human (and social) capital for immigrants. For example, attending language club 
activities or taking art and craft courses may boost host country-specific skills/knowledge and language 
proficiency. It is reasonable to expect that the longer the immigrants reside in the host country, the higher 
is the level of country-specific human capital accumulated and the lower will be the difference with the 
human capital of natives. This argument is in line with the assimilation theory suggesting convergence 
in the use of time between immigrants and natives. To test the validity of this argument, in Table 4 we 
insert in the baseline model a set of dummy variables categorizing the time since migration of individuals 
and a dummy for second-generation Americans13.  
Model 1 shows the results for informal education as the dependent variable. In line with our 
predictions, the propensity to engage in informal education is higher for recent immigrants and decreases 
steadily in size with the time spent in the US. Immigrants residing in the US for less than 6 years are 
almost 8 times more likely to engage in informal education than immigrants that were in US for more 
than 20 years. However, the results also show that the amount of time spent in informal education does 
not follow a clear decreasing pattern when time since immigration increases.  
Second-generation Americans look like natives in terms of time spent in informal education. Their 
propensity to engage in informal education is higher than that of natives but not too different from that 
of immigrants that were in US for more than 20 years (9.5 percent and 6.2 percent, respectively). Overall, 
the results suggest that a slow process of assimilation with natives is ongoing and that this process is not 
fully completed for the second-generation immigrants. 
With regard to time spent in formal education, results in Model 2 resemble what is found for informal 
education. The propensity (and intensity) to invest in human capital enhancing activities is significantly 
higher for recent immigrants but then converges (slowly) to that of US-born persons over time. 
Interestingly, we find that significant—although small—differences carry on to the children of 
immigrants (second-generation). 
A. Formal and Informal Education: The Complementarity Issue  
So far, in our analysis, we have excluded the possibility that the time spent in formal education and 
informal education activities might complement each other. In many cases, classes for a degree could 
be complemented with additional extracurricular classes or club activities aimed at enhancing the 
knowledge of a topic or gaining new skills. However, individuals might combine investment in formal 
and informal education differently. For example, individuals that have already completed their formal 
educational track may decide to further invest in informal education as a way to avoid skills and human 
capital depreciation or to update their skills and competences. Evidently, investments in informal 
education complement previous investments in formal education and occur when individuals have 
already completed the formal educational track. This latter typology of complementarity has a sequential 
rather than a contemporary nature14. 
                                                     
13 Both variables are used by Hamermesh and Trejo (2013) to measure the process of assimilation of immigrants in terms of 
time-used in purchasing, education and work activities. Their definition of education includes both formal and informal 
education. 
14 We exclude here the possibility that informal education could be performed before enrolling in formal education (for 
example, high school or university) and could determine further formal education. In any case, this circumstance and 
sequential complementarity in general does not invalidate the analysis as long as formal and informal education are not 
performed simultaneously. We control for sequential complementarity by using educational attainment dummies as in Fahr 
(2005). 
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When individuals’ choices over these two activities are simultaneous (that is, taken in the same 
period under analysis), the estimates presented above are likely to be biased if formal education is not 
considered explicitly in the analysis15. One way to deal with this issue is to restrict the sample to only 
those individuals that are not enrolled in formal education, for which the risk of simultaneity is quite 
low or even absent. The ATUS data has detailed information on whether the respondent was enrolled in 
school, high school or university in the week preceding the survey. We use this information to identify 
all individuals that declared to be enrolled in the formal educational system and exclude them from the 
estimations16.  
In Table 5 we investigate the presence of simultaneity and its effect on the baseline results. In Model 
1, where we use the entire sample, we insert a dummy for individuals enrolled in formal education (In 
education) and its interaction with foreign-born (Foreign-born*In education). The results of Model 1 
are informative in several ways; (i) the positive and significant coefficient of In education suggests the 
presence of simultaneity (that is, enrolled individuals are more likely to engage in informal education); 
(ii) the positive and significant coefficient of the interaction indicates that simultaneity could be higher 
for enrolled immigrants; (iii) the positive and highly significant coefficient of the dummy Foreign-born 
indicates that, even after controlling for formal education, immigrants are still more likely to engage in 
informal education, and conditional on participation, they spend more time in these activities (coefficient 
of Foreign-born in tier 2)17. 
To address the simultaneity issue, in Model 2 and Model 3 we include in the sample only individuals 
that are not enrolled in the formal educational system. The results of these estimations certify the results 
obtained on the whole sample of individuals and presented above in Table 1 and Table 2. 
A further robustness check on the issue of potential simultaneity is reported in Table 6 where we 
estimate the baseline model separately for individuals that spend a positive amount of time in formal 
education (Model 1) and those who spend no time in formal education in the diary day (Model 2). In the 
former specification (that is, when simultaneity is present), the probability to engage in informal 
education is not significantly different for foreign born compared to natives. On the contrary, in Model 
2—where simultaneity is less likely—results confirm what was previously found in the baseline 
estimations presented above. Overall, the tests presented in this section confirm that our baseline results 
are not significantly affected by simultaneity. 
V. Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
The accumulation of human capital in a society is fundamental for boosting growth, and more generally, 
the well-being of citizens. When this investment is carried out by immigrants there is an additional gain 
for the community at large as human capital speeds up the process of socio-economic integration.  
In this paper we have focused our attention on informal education, a crucial channel (often the only 
available one) of human capital enhancement for immigrants. We firstly provide a theoretical framework 
that allows us to generate hypotheses about the factors that drive individuals’ incentives to invest in 
informal education, and to discuss how immigrants may diverge from natives with respect to some of 
these drivers. Our empirical findings, in line with our theoretical predictions, show that foreign-born 
individuals invest more than natives in informal education. The probability of engaging in training and 
extra-curricular formative activities is higher for foreign-born people than for natives, and the time 
                                                     
15 If time devoted to formal and informal education are simultaneously decided, then formal education is a crucial determinant 
of informal education. Hence, it must be controlled for explicitly in the estimations in order to avoid serious omitted 
variables bias. The fact that formal education is endogenous prevents its use in the econometric model. 
16 Individuals in formal education is only 10 percent of the sample. Note that for those who declare that they are not enrolled, 
we know their highest educational degree. Hence, we control for their level of educational attainment in the estimations. 
17 As stated in footnote (15), due to endogeneity, these relationships could not be interpreted as causal. 
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devoted to these activities, conditional on engaging in it, is longer. We show that the main drivers are 
economic incentives mostly in the early phase of working life, as differences tends to disappear over 
time, and in particular, when the residual working time is shortened.  
We also show that differences between the foreign-born and natives are generally larger in informal 
education than in formal education. As we are focusing on adults that have already made their decision 
over formal education when young, these findings show that informal education is fundamental in the 
process of investing in host-country specific human (and social) capital.  
Interestingly, the differences between natives and immigrants persist across generations. We find 
that second generation immigrants tend to allocate more time to educational activities (also in terms of 
formal education). 
Given the potential importance of informal education for immigrants’ integration in the host 
economy and society, it would be interesting to explore additional dimensions that might facilitate or 
inhibit time allocated to these activities. Immigrants from different origin countries or living in different 
areas (such as more or less ethnically segregated ones) might have different propensities to invest in 
informal education. Analysis on other destination countries might also deliver interesting information 
that relates to the context in which migration takes place and the policies that govern the phenomena. 
More data on time-use in different countries are becoming available and more immigrants are being 
included in these data collection efforts. These interesting questions are left for future research.  
  
On the road to integration? Immigrants’ demand for informal (& formal) education 




Nicola D. Coniglio 
University of Bari Aldo Moro 
Largo Abbazia S. Scolastica  




Migration Policy Centre 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, EUI 
Villa Malafrasca 
Via Boccaccio 151 
I-50133 Firenze (FI) 
Email: Rezart.Hoxhaj@eui.eu  
 
Hubert Jayet 
University of Lille  
Lille Economie et Management (LEM) 
59655 Villeneuve d'Ascq Cedex, Lille (France) 
Email: hubert.jayet@univ-lille.fr 
  
Nicola D. Coniglio, Rezart Hoxhaj, Hubert Jayet 
12 Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Working Papers 
References 
Barrett, Garry F., and Daniel S. Hamermesh. 2019. “Labor Supply Elasticities Overcoming Nonclassical 
Measurement Error Using More Accurate Hours Data.” Journal of Human Resources 54(1): 255 – 
265.  
Becker, Gary S. 1965. “A Theory of the Allocation of Time.” The Economic Journal 75 (299): 493-517. 
Bound, John, Charles Brown, and Nancy Mathiowetz. 2001. “Measurement Error in Survey Data.” In 
Handbook of Econometrics 5, ed. James Heckman and Edward Leamer, 3705–843. Amsterdam: 
Elsevier. 
Caparrós Ruiz, Antonio. 2017. “Adolescents’ Time-use in Spain: Does the Parental 
Human Capital Matter?” Child Indicators Research 10(1): 81 – 99.  
Colleman, James S. 1988. “Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital.” American Journal of 
Sociology 94: 95 – 120.  
Cragg, John G. 1971. “Some Statistical Models for Limited Dependent Variables with Application to 
the Demand for Durable Goods.” Econometrica 39(5):829–844.  
Hamermesh, Daniel S., and Gerard A. Pfann. 2005. “Time-use Data in Economics.” European 
Economic Review 49: 1 – 7. 
Hamermesh, Daniel S., and Stephen J. Trejo. 2013. “How do Immigrants Spend their Time? 
The Process of Assimilation.” Journal of Population Economics 26:507–530.  
Hofferth, Sandra L., Sarah M. Flood, and Matthew Sobek. 2017. American Time-use Survey Data 
Extract Builder: Version 2.6 [dataset]. College Park, MD: University of Maryland and Minneapolis, 
MN: University of Minnesota. https://doi.org/10.18128/D060.V2.7  
Horrigan, Michael and Hertz Diane. 2004. “Planning, Designing and Executing the BLS American 
Time-use Survey.” Monthly Labor Review 127(10): 3–19.  
Juster, Thomas F., Hiromi Ono, and Frank P. Stafford. 2003. “An Assessment of Alternative  
Measures of Time-use.” Sociological Methodology 33(1): 19–54. 
Fahr, Rene. 2005. “Loafing or learning? - The Demand for Informal Education.” European Economic 
Review 49: 75 – 98.  
Ribar, David C. 2012. “Immigrants’ Time-use: A Survey of Methods and Evidence.” IZA Discussion 
Paper 6931. Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor.  
OECD. 2014. “Skills Beyond School: Synthesis Report” OECD Reviews of Vocational Training: OECD 
Publishing. www.oecd-ilibrary.org/education/skills-beyond-school_9789264214682-en  
Vargas, Andres J. 2016. “Assimilation Effects Beyond the Labor Market: Time Allocations of Mexican 
Immigrants to the US.” Review of Economics of the Household 14 (3): 625–668. 
Zimmermann, Klaus F., and Anzelika Zaiceva. 2014. “Children, Kitchen, Church: Does Ethnicity 
Matter?” Review of Economics of the Household 12(1): 83–103. 
  
On the road to integration? Immigrants’ demand for informal (& formal) education 
European University Institute 13 
 
  
Table 1 Participation and time spent in formal and informal education by immigrants and natives 
        Immigrants                  Natives 
VARIABLES Mean Participation Conditional Mean Participation Conditional 
  rate % mean  rate % mean 
Informal 
education 
1.74 1.2 141 0.98 0.9 108 
(minutes/day) (0.19)  (11.8) (0.04)  (3.13) 
Formal education 8.3 3.1 263 8.5 3.2 261 
(minutes/day) (0.83)  (7.4) (0.15)  (2.88) 
Observations 24865 145.98 
Notes: Statistics are weighted using the variable wt06 (ATUS methodology for 2006). Standard error in 
parenthesis. 
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Table 2 Time spent in informal education: immigrants versus natives (baseline estimations) 
 Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  
 Full sample Only employed Only employed 
VARIABLES Tier1 Tier2 Tier1 Tier2 Tier1 Tier2 
Foreign Born 0.179*** 62.04*** 0.151*** 96.77*** 0.157*** 86.56** 
 (0.022) (23.66) (0.0372) (37.16) (0.0419) (35.98) 
Age -0.024*** 9.376** -0.036*** 8.959 -0.036*** 6.475 
 (0.00356) (3.659) (0.005) (5.931) (0.005) (7.243) 
Age2 0.0002*** -0.121*** 0.0003*** -0.131* 0.000*** -0.108 
 (0.000) (0.041) (0.000) (0.071) (0.000) (0.0862) 
Female 0.159*** -36.10* 0.133*** -34.96 0.136*** -37.15 
 (0.019) (21.93) (0.0247) (30.09) (0.024) (30.05) 
Married 0.0290 7.330 0.004 -6.327 0.0125 9.986 
 (0.023) (27.97) (0.026) (44.64) (0.033) (51.34) 
Children 0-2 -0.270*** -102.9** -0.176*** -107.0 -0.186*** -153.1** 
 (0.039) (50.21) (0.059) (73.33) (0.062) (70.69) 
Children 3-5 -0.121*** -127.5*** -0.092* -158.1*** -0.105* -162.2*** 
 (0.037) (39.64) (0.049) (59.12) (0.056) (62.37) 
Children 6-12 -0.095*** -12.58 -0.064 -17.91 -0.069 -35.43 
 (0.029) (23.19) (0.040) (35.39) (0.043) (38.20) 
Children 13-17 0.005 -16.56 0.038 -9.298 0.033 10.27 
 (0.032) (30.55) (0.040) (46.36) (0.041) (55.67) 
Illiterate  0.405* -203.8* 0.032 274.8* -3.061*** 0 
 (0.236) (106.0) (0.456) (166.3) (0.234) (0) 
Middle school 0.410** 80.67 0.211 222.3 0.174 325.4* 
 (0.205) (127.7) (0.241) (149.0) (0.231) (195.8) 
Secondary  0.399** 111.3 0.035 267.6* -0.002 337.9* 
 (0.203) (118.0) (0.255) (144.5) (0.250) (187.8) 
Degree  0.577*** 139.7 0.225 319.1** 0.187 396.8** 
 (0.204) (125.3) (0.252) (145.4) (0.250) (179.6) 
Postgraduate 0.694*** 118.7 0.340 327.9** 0.283 415.3** 
 (0.200) (120.5) (0.252) (145.4) (0.256) (181.7) 
Holiday  0.139*** -105.5*** 0.173*** -57.56 0.168*** -47.25 
 (0.048) (26.59) (0.045) (35.21) (0.047) (36.30) 
Unemployed  0.185*** 68.69**     
 (0.033) (27.12)     
Not in labor  0.205*** 79.98***     
force (0.025) (22.94)     
Household     
income dummies NO NO YES 
Constant -2.397*** -308.5* -1.830*** -495.1* -1.875*** -593.5* 
 (0.218) (162.3) (0.253) (261.1) (0.275) (346.6) 
Sigma  191.1***  191.0***  191.9*** 
  (18.43)  (23.01)  (21.86) 
Observations 169,724 1665 105,925 865 98,216 768 
Dependent variables: 1st Tier is informal education (0,1); 2nd Tier is time spent in informal education. Reference 
categories are: No children; Primary; Employed. Area size dummies, state and year fixed effects are used in all 
models. Errors are clustered at the state level. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
On the road to integration? Immigrants’ demand for informal (& formal) education 


















Table 4 Time since migration and time-use in informal and formal education 
 Model (1)  Model (2) 
 Informal education Formal education 
VARIABLES Tier1 Tier2 Tier1 Tier2 
Second generation 0.095** 12.43 0.081** 37.61*** 
 (0.047) (40.53) (0.038) (12.98) 
Year since immigration:<6 0.502*** 101.1** 0.343*** 52.79*** 
 (0.060) (44.80) (0.041) (19.83) 
Year since immigration: 6-10 0.275*** -9.040 0.172*** 56.10** 
 (0.052) (68.47) (0.062) (24.59) 
Year since immigration: 11-20 0.279*** 71.00** 0.072** 24.19 
 (0.030) (31.97) (0.036) (23.17) 
Year since immigration:>20 0.062* 44.20 0.015 40.43** 
 (0.036) (31.77) (0.029) (20.39) 
Constant -2.668*** -123.5 -0.221 6.754 
 (0.211) (161.9) (0.201) (170.2) 
Sigma  184.0***  256.0*** 
  (16.12)  (6.251) 
Observations 162,236 1449 162,236 4673 
Dependent variables: 1st Tier is informal education (0,1); 2nd Tier is time spent in informal education. Individuals 
over 17 years old are considered. This table includes all control variables as in Table 2 and results are available 
in the Online Appendix. Errors are clustered at the state level. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, 




Table 3 Residual working life and time-use in informal education 
 Model (1) 
VARIABLES Tier1 Tier2 
Foreign born <= 45age 0.261*** 62.98** 
 (0.0315) (29.36) 
Foreign born > 45age 0.112*** 21.87 
 (0.024) (37.20) 
Constant -2.749*** -139.4 
 (0.211) (147.7) 
Sigma  181.5*** 
  (16.06) 
Observations 162,236 1449 
Dependent variables: 1st Tier is informal education (0,1); 2nd Tier is time spent 
in informal education. Individuals over 17 years old are considered. This table 
includes all control variables as in Table 2 and results are available in the 
Online Appendix. Errors are clustered at the state level. Robust standard errors 
in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6 Informal and formal education for immigrants: substitute or complements? 
 Model (1) Model (2) 
 Time spent in formal edu>0 Time spent in formal edu=0 
VARIABLES Tier1 Tier2 Tier1 Tier2 
Foreign Born 0.104 17.27 0.193*** 56.70** 
 (0.076) (42.70) (0.022) (22.03) 
Constant 0.176 312.1 -2.745*** -128.2 
 (0.796) (278.4) (0.220) (149.4) 
Sigma  106.5***  186.3*** 
  (20.04)  (16.48) 
Observations 8,149 195 161,586 1470 
Dependent variables: 1st Tier is informal education (0,1); 2nd Tier is time spent in informal education. 
Individuals over 17 years old are considered. This table includes all control variables as in Table 2 and results 
are available in the Online Appendix. State fixed effects are not included in model 1 because the model does 
not converge. Errors are clustered at the state level. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 5 Informal and formal education of immigrants: substitutes or complements? 
           Model (1)              Model (2)       Model (3) 
 Full sample Not in education Not in education  
VARIABLES Tier1 Tier2 Tier1 Tier2 Tier1 Tier2 
Foreign born  0.160*** 50.25** 0.172*** 46.67**   
 (0.026) (23.89) (0.025) (21.93)   
In education 0.306*** -31.68     
 (0.037) (47.05)     
Foreign born*In  0.111** 43.94     
education (0.054) (44.89)     
Foreign born <=      0.255*** 55.74** 
45age     (0.0382) (28.16) 
Foreign born >      0.101*** 24.77 
45age     (0.025) (35.75) 
Constant -2.79*** -260.4* -3.00*** 4.935 -3.25*** 7.032 
 (0.243) (151.9) (0.240) (129.6) (0.242) (139.4) 
Sigma  190.8***  172.9***  170.6*** 
  (18.32)  (16.39)  (16.42) 
Observations 169,724 1665 153,093 1279 151,912 1254 
Dependent variables: 1st Tier is informal education (0,1); 2nd Tier is time spent in informal education. 
Individuals over 17 years old are considered. This table includes all control variables as in Table 2 and results 
are available in the Online Appendix. Errors are clustered at the state level. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 1 
Determination of the trajectories of informal education and human capital accumulation 
In this note we describe in detail the analysis of the optimal trajectories of investment in informal 
education by the agent and the subsequent accumulation of human capital. Let us start from the fact that, 
once time devoted to informal education, 𝑒𝑡, is known, the values of time allocated respectively to 
consumption, 𝑐𝑡, and work, 𝜃𝑡, are determined by the budget constraint 𝑐𝑡 ≤ 𝑤(ℎ𝑡)𝜃𝑡 and the time 
constraint 𝜃𝑡 + 𝑐𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡 ≤ ?̅?. Knowing that both constraints will always be binding, we can combine 
them, getting  
 
(A1)    𝑐𝑡 = 𝑤(ℎ𝑡)𝜃𝑡 = 𝑤(ℎ𝑡)(?̅? − 𝑒𝑡 − 𝑐𝑡) =
𝑤(ℎ𝑡)(?̅?−𝑒𝑡)
1+𝑤(ℎ𝑡)
                                        
and the utility of the agent at date t may be written as:  
 















where the control variable, 𝑒𝑡, meets the constraint 0 ≤ 𝑒𝑡 ≤ ?̅? and the state variable measuring human 
capital at time t, ℎ𝑡, follows the movement equation:  
 
ℎ̀𝑡 = 𝑎 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑒𝑡 − , 0) 
There is no terminal condition. The current value Lagrangian of this problem is:  
 
ℒ = 𝑢 (
𝑤(ℎ𝑡)(?̅? − 𝑒𝑡)
1 + 𝑤(ℎ𝑡)
) + 𝜆𝑡𝑎 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑒𝑡 − , 0) + 𝜇𝑡
0𝑒𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡
1(?̅? − 𝑒𝑡) 
where 𝜆𝑡 is the cofactor associated to the movement equation, 𝜇𝑡
0 is the Lagrange multiplier associated 
to the constraint 0 ≤ 𝑒𝑡, and 𝜇𝑡
1 is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the constraint 𝑒𝑡 ≤ ?̅?.  
Following the Maximum Principle, the conditions for an optimum are:  
 






𝑢′(𝑐𝑡) + 𝜆𝑡𝑎(𝑒𝑡 − ) + 𝜇𝑡
0 − 𝜇𝑡
1 = 0    







′(𝑐𝑡)     
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where (𝑒𝑡 − ) = 0 if 𝑒𝑡 − ≤ 0 and (𝑒𝑡 − ) = 1 if 𝑒𝑡 − > 0. We also have the transversality 
condition:  
𝜆𝑇 = 0 
Note that, if 𝑒𝑡 < , then 𝜇𝑡






𝑢′(𝑐𝑡) > 0 
which implies that no time is allocated to informal education, 𝑒𝑡 = 0 , and, as a consequence no human 
capital is accumulated, then ℎ̀𝑡 = 0. But ℎ̀𝑡 = 0 implies that ℎ𝑡 does not change and then, with an 
invariant stock of human capital, the agent always takes the same decision. Moreover, the terminal 
condition 𝜆𝑇 = 0 also implies 𝜇𝑡
0 > 0 and then 𝑒𝑡 = 0 or 𝑒𝑡 = .  
If < 𝑒𝑡 < ?̅?, then 𝜇𝑡
0 = 𝜇𝑡
1 = 0, so that (A2) becomes:  
 
(A4)   𝜆𝑡 =
𝑤(ℎ𝑡) 𝑎⁄
1+𝑤(ℎ𝑡)
𝑢′(𝑐𝑡)                  




















where −𝜂(𝑐𝑡) = − 𝑐𝑡𝑢
"(𝑐𝑡) 𝑢

















so that:  
 









?̇?𝑡     
Let us now rewrite (A3) as:  








And then, combining with (A4):  
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so that, combining (A5) and (A6) we obtain the equation defining the optimal trajectory for the informal 
education variable:  
 






]    
Along a trajectory (ℎ𝑡 , 𝑒𝑡) starting from the initial level of human capital, ℎ0, and the initial choice of 
informal education, 𝑒0, we have:  
 


















]      




= 0 ⟺ ?̇?𝑡 = 0 ⟺  𝑒𝑡 = ?̅? or 𝑒𝑡 = 𝑍(ℎ𝑡) 
𝑑𝑒𝑡
𝑑ℎ𝑡
⋛ 0 ⟺ ?̇?𝑡 ⋛ 0 ⟺  𝑒𝑡 < ?̅? and 𝑒𝑡 ⋛ 𝑍(ℎ𝑡) 
with  
 







   
Let us now focus on the iso-elastic case, with 𝜂(𝑐𝑡) = 𝜂 ∈ [0,1] and 𝑤(ℎ𝑡) = (ℎ𝑡)
𝛾 with 𝛾 ∈ [0,1]. 
Equations (A7), (A8) and (A9) can be re-written as:  
 







]     













]    







    
The dynamics of the agent's choice are represented in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1. Dynamics of the agent’s choice 
 
The black thick curve represents the highest possible trajectory of investment in informal education 
where we have ?̇?𝑡 = 0. This curve has two parts: a horizontal part, corresponding to the time constraint, 
𝑒𝑡 = ?̅?, where the agent allocates all the available time to informal education and a decreasing part, 
corresponding to 𝑒𝑡 = 𝑍(ℎ𝑡). This line crosses the horizontal line 𝑒𝑡 =  —that is the level of investment 
in informal education below which human capital accumulation stops—at a threshold level of human 
capital equal to ℎ𝑡 = ℎ
+; for any level of initial human capital ℎ𝑡 > ℎ
+, agents will never invest in 
informal education. For meeting the transversality condition, a trajectory must end on the horizontal 
axis, knowing that if, at some 𝜏 < 𝑇, 𝑒𝜏 = , then 𝑒𝑡 = 0 for every 𝑡 ∈] 𝜏, 𝑇]. This rules out all the 
trajectories that are above the curve ?̇?𝑡 = 0, as along these trajectories 𝑒𝑡 increases and then moves away 
from the horizontal axis. This also rules out the trajectories that are above the thick grey curve, which is 
the trajectory crossing the intersection of the curve ?̇?𝑡 = 0 at ℎ𝑡 = ℎ
+, as these trajectories cross the 
curve ?̇?𝑡 = 0 and then end with 𝑒𝑡 increasing (an example is the thin dotted grey line). A typical 
trajectory has the shape given by the thin grey line. If the agent's human capital is not too high (ℎ𝑡 <
ℎ+), the agent starts with a time devoted to informal education 𝑒𝑡 > . Then, the time devoted to 
education decreases along the trajectory until 𝑒𝑡 = ; at that time, the agent jumps to 𝑒𝑡 = 0 until the 
end of her life. The agent chooses the highest possible trajectory which implies that, if the life is not too 
long, she ends at 𝑒𝑇 = . If her lifetime is longer, the agent chooses the limit trajectory and, at some age 
< 𝑇 , we have 𝑒𝑡 =  and ℎ𝑡 = ℎ
+. Then, for the end of her life, 𝑒𝑡 = 0 and the agent does not have 
informal education. 
Derivatives 
The signs are derived under the assumption that ?̇?𝑡 < 0 and in the isoelastic case 
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If a increases, then the slope 𝑑𝑒𝑡 𝑑ℎ𝑡⁄  of every trajectory is more negative implying that, for the same 
starting point (ℎ0, 𝑒0), the new trajectory is below the old one. Consequently, for every level ℎ𝑡 of 
human capital, 𝑒𝑡 is lower (or, reciprocally, for every 𝑒𝑡, the value of ℎ𝑡 on the trajectory is lower). The 
direct effect of an increase in a on ?̇?𝑡 is negative and, ℎ𝑡 being lower and 𝜕?̇?𝑡 𝜕ℎ𝑡⁄ > 0, the indirect 
effect is also negative. Along the new trajectory, 𝑒𝑡 decreases at a higher speed (−?̇?𝑡 > 0 is higher) and 
the new trajectory takes less time. Then, for reaching the target 𝑒𝑇 = , the agent starts from a higher 
value of 𝑒0.  





























If ?̅? increases, then the slope 𝑑𝑒𝑡 𝑑ℎ𝑡⁄  of every trajectory is more negative implying that, for the same 
starting point (ℎ0, 𝑒0), the new trajectory is below the old one. Consequently, for every level ℎ𝑡 of 
human capital, 𝑒𝑡 is lower (or, reciprocally, for every 𝑒𝑡, the value of ℎ𝑡 on the trajectory is lower). 
Then, the higher value of ?̅? implies a more negative value of ?̇?𝑡, both directly because 𝜕?̇?𝑡 𝜕?̅?⁄ < 0 and 
indirectly because ℎ𝑡 is lower and 𝜕?̇?𝑡 𝜕ℎ𝑡⁄ > 0. Along the new trajectory, 𝑒𝑡 decreases at a higher speed 
(−?̇?𝑡 > 0 is higher) and the new trajectory takes less time. Then, for reaching the target 𝑒𝑇 = , the 
agent starts from a higher value of 𝑒0.  
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] < 0 
If  increases, then the slope 𝑑𝑒𝑡 𝑑ℎ𝑡⁄  of every trajectory is more negative implying that, for the same 
starting point (ℎ0, 𝑒0), the new trajectory is below the old one. Consequently, for every level ℎ𝑡 of 
human capital, 𝑒𝑡 is lower (or, reciprocally, for every 𝑒𝑡, the value of ℎ𝑡 on the trajectory is lower). The 
direct effect of an increase in  on ?̇?𝑡 is positive, but ℎ𝑡 being lower and 𝜕?̇?𝑡 𝜕ℎ𝑡⁄ < 0, there a positive 
indirect effect. Then, we cannot tell whether the new trajectory takes more or less time than the new one 
and the impact of a on 𝑒𝑡 is ambiguous. 
















If 𝜌 increases, then the slope 𝑑𝑒𝑡 𝑑ℎ𝑡⁄  of every trajectory is less negative implying that, for the same 
starting point (ℎ0, 𝑒0), the new trajectory is above the old one. Consequently, for every level ℎ𝑡 of human 
capital, 𝑒𝑡 is higher (or, reciprocally, for every 𝑒𝑡, the value of ℎ𝑡 on the trajectory is higher). Then, the 
higher value of 𝜌 implies a less negative value of ?̇?𝑡, both directly because 𝜕?̇?𝑡 𝜕𝜌⁄ > 0 and indirectly 
because ℎ𝑡 is higher and 𝜕?̇?𝑡 𝜕ℎ𝑡⁄ > 0. Along the new trajectory, 𝑒𝑡 decreases at a lower speed (−?̇?𝑡 <
0 is higher) and the new trajectory takes more time. Then, for reaching the target 𝑒𝑇 = , the agent starts 
from a lower value of 𝑒0. 
  
On the road to integration? Immigrants’ demand for informal (& formal) education 
European University Institute 23 
Appendix 2  
  
Table 2A. Descriptive statistics of variables used in the estimation 
 Immigrants           Natives 
VARIABLES Mean St. Error Mean St. Error 
Age 46.4 0.12 48.7 0.054 
Female 0.61 0.003 0.61 0.001 
Married 0.53 0.004 0.42 0.001 
No children 0.51 0.004 0.60 0.001 
Children of age 0-2  0.13 0.002 0.1 0.001 
Children of age 3-5  0.16 0.003 0.12 0.001 
Children of age 6-12  0.29 0.004 0.24 0.001 
Children of age 13-17  0.16 0.003 0.13 0.001 
Illiterate 0.01 0.001 0.0006 0.000 
Elementary  0.036 0.001 0.002 0.000 
Middle school 0.12 0.002 0.025 0.000 
Secondary  0.50 0.004 0.64 0.001 
Degree 0.187 0.003 0.21 0.001 
Postgraduate 0.14 0.003 0.12 0.001 
Employed 0.63 0.004 0.62 0.001 
Unemployed 0.05 0.002 0.042 0.000 
Not in labor force 0.32 0.004 0.33 0.001 
Observations 24.865 145.977 
Source: ATUS data (2003–15) 
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Table 2B Definition of informal education 
1. Extracurricular club activities (category activity examples)  
Attending: 
American Field Service activities, including 
meetings; 
Key Club activities, including meetings 
Language club activities 
Math club activities 
National Honor Society activities 
Science club activities 
Participating and practicing: 
Academic club activities, including 
meetings 
Chess club activities, including meetings 
Debate club competition 
 
 
2. Taking class for personal interest (category activity examples) 
Attending: Talking: 
Sunday school To classmates 
Dance class (personal interest) To teacher 
Prenatal/childcare classes (personal   
interest)  
Taking:   
Car maintenance/repair class Driver's education 
Cooking class  Driving lessons 
Financial planning class Music/voice lessons 
Massage class On-line course 
Pottery class Parenting class 
Table 2B Definition of informal education (continued) 
Retirement planning seminar Personal development classes 
Sewing class Photography class 
Wine appreciation class Self-defense class 
Academic class Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation (CPR),  
Art, craft, hobby, recreational course first aid class 
3. Research or homework for class for personal interest (category of 
activities) 
Attending study group Reading 
Listening to language CD Reading/sending e-mail 
Organizing notes Studying 
4. Other activities for personal interest (category of activities) 
Preparing and studying for: SAT; GMAT; GRE; LSAT; CPA exam; English for  
personal interest (2015) 
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Table 2C Description of the variables 
VARIABLES Definition Source 
Dependent variables   
𝑌𝑖𝑗 Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent has spent  ATUS  
 a positive amount of time in informal education, 2003–15 
 and 0 otherwise.  
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑖𝑗 Amount of time (in minutes) spent in informal  -//- 
 education.  
Explanatory and control variables 
𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑗 Dummy equal to 1 if the respondent was born abroad, 0  CPS 
 otherwise.  
Age Age in years -//- 
Age squared The square of age. -//- 
Female Dummy equal to 1 if the respondent is female, 0  -//- 
 otherwise.  
Married Dummy equal to 1 if the respondent is married, 0  -//- 
 otherwise.  
No children, children  5 dummy variables equal to 1 if the respondent has a  -//- 
0-2 years, children child in these age groups, 0 otherwise.  
3-5 years, children   
6-12 years, children   
13-17 years   
Illiterate, Elementary,  6 dummy variables for each of the educational level  -//- 
Middle, Secondary,  specified.  
Degree, Post    
graduate   
Holiday Dummy equal to 1 if the diary day is (Sunday, New  ATUS  
 Year’s Day, Easter, Memorial Day, 4th of July or  2003–15 
 Christmas), 0 otherwise.  
Table 2C Description of the variables (continued) 
Employed  In the reference week, worked at least 1 hour as a paid 
employee or self-employed. It also includes those in 
CPS 
 job but not at work in the reference week and the  
 unpaid family workers.  
Unemployed Individual available for work at the reference week and those 
making an effort to find a job in the 3 weeks 
-//- 
 preceding the reference week.  
Not in labor force Individual that had not actively looked for a job in the 3 
weeks preceding the reference week. 
-//- 
   
